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Abstract 
We investigate whether ownership concentration influences bank profitability in a developing 
country context. We focus on bank ownership concentration measured as the amount of direct 
equity held by a majority shareholder categorised into: high ownership concentration, 
moderate ownership concentration and disperse ownership. We find that banks with high 
ownership concentration have higher return on assets, higher net interest margin and higher 
recurring earning power while banks with dispersed ownership have lower return on assets 
but have higher return on equity. Also, higher cost efficiency improves the return on assets of 
widely-held banks and the return on equity of banks with moderate ownership. The findings 
have implications. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate whether ownership structure, a corporate governance determinant, play an 
important role for bank profitability. More specifically, we examine whether different levels 
of ownership concentration can explain differences in bank profitability. The question 
whether ownership structure influences the profitability of firms is examined by a fairly large 
literature with rather mixed results depending on the context examined (Arun and Turner, 
2004; Choi and Hasan, 2005; Chen et al., 2007), and such studies focus largely on foreign 
ownership (Greenaway et al, 2014), family ownership (De Massis et al, 2013), state 
ownership (Cornett et al 2010) and institutional ownership (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010), with 
little focus on direct equity holding of majority shareholders. In this study, we focus on a 
different ownership structure categorisation involving direct equity ownership concentration.  
Bank ownership concentration is important because it can influence (or limit) bank managers’ 
ability to divert bank profits as pecuniary benefits to themselves or as private control benefits 
to controlling shareholders which can lead to a reduction in firm value and could potentially 
hurt non-controlling shareholders that do not have control stake in banks. For instance, the 
2004 to 2006 banking boom caused by excessive securitisation gains just before the 2008 
global financial crisis proved that bank insiders (mainly managers and controlling 
shareholders) exploited banks for their own purposes, thereby increasing the risk of bank 
failure, and gave rise to the need to identify an optimal bank ownership structure that 
improves bank performance while discouraging excessive risk-taking and misappropriation 
of profits among banks. 
In Nigeria, the 2000-2010 banking reform led to bank mergers, acquisition and consolidation 
activities intended to strengthen the banking sector, and the merger, acquisition and 
consolidation process led to significant changes in bank ownership to permit ownership by 
various wealthy families and rich individuals including few institutional ownership in an 
attempt to reduce government’s control of banks, which consequently led to greater number 
of individual shareholders with large direct equity holding in Nigerian banks. Moreover, large 
direct equity ownership by controlling shareholders can have serious consequences for bank 
profitability depending on whether controlling shareholders have private control benefits or 
whether there are shared control benefits that accrue to both controlling and non-controlling 
owners, and this effect also depend on the levels of ownership concentration in Nigerian 
banks. Therefore, our curiosity leads us to investigate the case of Nigeria to examine the 
influence of differing levels of ownership concentration on bank profitability and we focus on 
banks because they play an important role in the financial intermediation process in Nigeria 
and because they have additional characteristics that make them distinct from non-financial 
firms. 
Using a sample of Nigerian banks, we find that banks with high ownership concentration are 
more profitable: they have higher return on assets (ROA), net interest margin (NIM) and 
recurring earning power (REP) while banks with dispersed ownership have higher return on 
equity (ROE). Also, higher cost efficiency improves the return on assets of banks that are 
widely-held and the return on equity of banks with moderate ownership. 
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Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, we contribute to the literature that 
explores the relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability. By 
focussing on banks, our analyses provide insights on how different levels of bank ownership 
concentration affect bank profitability, we show that high ownership concentration has 
positive effects for ROA while dispersed ownership has positive effects for ROE while we 
observe no significant effect for moderate ownership in a developing country context. This 
insight gained can improve our understanding of specific ownership structures that improve 
bank profitability in developing countries. Secondly, our analyses contribute to the rich 
literature that explores the impact of ownership structure on firm performance, we show that 
apart from institutional ownership, family ownership and foreign bank ownership, direct 
equity ownership concentration is also a determinant of bank profitability for developing 
countries like Nigeria although this depends on the profitability metric employed. Thirdly, we 
contribute to the literature that explores the relationship between firm profitability and 
corporate governance determinants. By investigating a developing country context, we show 
that ownership concentration, a corporate governance determinant, is a possible corporate 
governance factor affecting bank profitability for developing countries. Finally, in contrast to 
prior Nigerian studies (Tsegba and Herbert, 2013; Uwuigbe and Olusanmi, 2012; Gugong et 
al, 2014), we investigate Nigerian banks and divide banks into three ownership categories to 
detect how concentrated ownership, moderate ownership and dispersed ownership affects 
bank profitability, an approach that has not being adopted by prior studies. This is our main 
contribution to the literature on ownership concentration and bank profitability in developing 
countries. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical and 
conceptual framework. Section 3 presents the relevant literature. Section 4 describes data, 
sample selection and ownership structure categorisation. Section 5 describes the 
methodology. Section 6 discusses the results regarding the impact of ownership concentration 
on bank profitability. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical and Contextual Framework 
 
Agency theory shows that managers use their discretion to pursue strategies that enrich 
themselves at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers can 
appropriate profits for personal use or to enhance their non-salary income and this practice 
leads to the misallocation of profits (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) demonstrate that when large shareholders are involved in firm decision making, as is 
the case in Nigeria, the conflict of interest shifts from managers versus shareholders to 
controlling shareholders versus non-controlling (or minority) shareholders. When the conflict 
of interest shifts to controlling shareholders versus non-controlling (or minority) 
shareholders, internal corporate governance mechanisms may become less effective to reduce 
the agency problems between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders 
because controlling shareholders wield significant power to influence the decisions and 
actions of top management compared to non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Moreover, the propensity for managers to misappropriate profit in the short-term to benefit 
themselves at the expense of controlling and non-controlling shareholders tend to be greater 
if managers do not have substantial ownership stake in firms they manage particularly in 
widely-held firms (that is, firms with dispersed ownership). When this is the case, managers 
can misappropriate profit for self-interest and such misappropriation of profits would 
negatively affect the level of reported profit of the firm; therefore, a negative relationship 
between dispersed ownership and profitability can be expected. However, a positive 
relationship between dispersed ownership and profitability can be expected if widely-held 
firms are made up of dispersed shareholders that exert some monitoring to limit managers 
from pursuing their self-interests, thus discouraging misappropriation of profits for perks, and 
such shareholders in widely-held firms may consist of bondholders, creditors, consumer 
protection agencies, government agencies, etc. 
 
On the other hand, controlling shareholders can elect their representative(s) to the board of 
directors who will appoint a manager that will act in their self-interest. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) demonstrate that controlling shareholders can impose 
greater monitoring on management, and use their influence to compel managers to make 
decisions that increase overall shareholder value for all, thereby benefiting all shareholders 
including minority shareholders, which improves firm performance and profitability. More 
so, the additional monitoring imposed on managers by controlling shareholders can compel 
managers to maximise profits for the firm; hence, managers of firms with large controlling 
shareholders are less likely to pursue their selfish interests because of the additional 
monitoring imposed on them by controlling shareholders (Thomsen and Pederson, 2000). As 
a consequence, we expect a positive relationship between firm profitability and concentrated 
ownership. 
 
However, when controlling shareholders have incentives to maximize their own benefits at 
the expense of non-controlling shareholders, controlling shareholders will seek private 
benefits of control such as the extraction of corporate resources through perks or transfer of 
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assets/profits, which in turn would hurt non-controlling shareholders through the resulting 
reduction in firm profit and firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When controlling 
shareholders pursue such objectives that increase their personal utility rather than maximise 
profit for all, then having such controlling shareholders can lead to decreased profitability for 
the firm. When this is the case, we expect a negative relationship between firm profitability 
and concentrated ownership. 
 
In Nigerian banking, controlling (or large) shareholders are often owners of banks. Compared 
to the 1980s where government-owned banks dominated the banking system in Nigeria, 
today banking in Nigeria has undergone dramatic changes. Nigeria in recent times has a 
deeper banking system and a relatively stable banking system although the challenges of high 
bank concentration, limited competition, rising non-performing loans, weak corporate 
governance, financial exclusion and sub-optimal ownership structure still persist. Controlling 
shareholders in Nigerian banks have the largest ownership stake and wield significant 
influence on the actions of top management in banks. Controlling shareholders in Nigerian 
banks also influence the production of bank’s accounting information and influence bank 
managers to divert corporate profits to themselves as private control benefits while minority 
shareholders suffer from the resulting reduction in firm value.    
 
3. Literature Review 
 
The influence of ownership structure on firm performance has been examined in the literature 
with mixed conclusions. Leech and Leahy (1991) find a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and profitability for large British companies implying that high 
ownership concentration has negative effects for profitability. Lehmann and Weigand (2000) 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 361 German firms 
during the 1991 to 1996 period and find that ownership concentration negatively affect firm 
profitability although they observe that high ownership concentration only improves the 
profitability of listed firms with large shareholders. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) did not 
find a significant relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Welch 
(2003), adopting the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examine the relationship 
between ownership structure and the performance of Australian listed companies and find 
that ownership by top management significantly influence firm performance measured as 
accounting rate of return, but did not find a significant result when firm performance is 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) investigate the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance among 175 Greek listed firms for the year 2000. 
After taking into account the likely endogeneity between ownership structure and firm 
performance, they find that a more concentrated ownership structure improves firm 
profitability, and that higher firm profitability require a less dispersed ownership. In contrast, 
Pervan et al. (2012) examine the relationship between ownership structure and ROA for listed 
firms in Croatia and find that firms with dispersed ownership have higher ROA than those 
with concentrated ownership. Phung and Mishra (2016) examine the effect of ownership 
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structure on the performance of listed firms over the 2007 to 2012 period and find a non-
linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. They observe that 
foreign ownership improves firm performance up to a certain point beyond which higher 
foreign ownership leads lowers firm performance. Lepore et al (2017) find that higher 
ownership concentration with an efficient judicial system improves firm performance 
particularly in countries with weak investor protection. Abdallah and Ismail (2017) find that 
the positive relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is an increasing 
function of dispersed ownership and that the value addition of good corporate governance is 
not necessarily maintained at high levels of ownership concentration. 
 
Among banks, Micco et al (2006) investigate whether the performance of public and private 
banks is driven by political considerations during the 1995 to 2002 period. They find that 
state-owned banks located in developing countries have lower profitability and higher costs 
than their private-owned banks. They did not find a strong correlation between bank 
ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Iannotta et al (2007) 
investigate the relationship between ownership structure, risk taking and bank performance 
for 181 European banks during the 1999-2004 period. They find that ownership concentration 
does not significantly affect bank profitability but rather high ownership concentration is 
associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk, thereby 
improving bank performance. Lin and Zhang (2009) investigate the impact of bank 
ownership reform on the performance of Chinese banks. They examine 60 Chinese banks 
during the 1997 to 2004 period, and find that ‘Big Four’ commercial banks which have 
concentrated ownership are less profitable, less efficient and have worse asset quality than 
other types of banks. Ben Slama and Boulila (2014) investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and bank performance with a focus on 53 Islamic banks over the 2005 to 
2009 period. They did not find a correlation between ownership concentration and firm 
performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), amongst 
others. Bian and Deng (2017) examine Chinese banks over the 2007-2014 period and find 
that higher ownership dispersion improves return on assets, return on equity and reduces the 
ratio of nonperforming loans. Overall, the literature on bank ownership structure and firm 
performance provides mixed evidence.  
Prior Nigerian studies examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance among non-financial firms in Nigeria. Tsegba and Herbert (2013) investigate the 
relationship between foreign ownership structure and firm performance for non-financial 
firms during the 2003 to 2007 period, and find that foreign ownership concentration has a 
negative impact on firm performance. Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) find that institutional 
ownership has positive effects for ROA while foreign ownership has positive effects for 
listed firms in the financial sector. Gugong et al (2014) find a positive significant relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). In contrast to prior Nigerian studies, we investigate a different type 
of ownership concentration categorisation. More specifically, we focus on Nigerian banks 
with controlling shareholders versus Nigerian banks with non-controlling shareholders and 
divide banks into three ownership categories to detect how concentrated ownership, moderate 
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ownership and dispersed ownership affects bank profitability in Nigeria. This is our main 
contribution to the scant literature on ownership concentration and bank profitability in 
developing countries. 
 
4. Data. 
4.1. Sample Selection 
Our study focus on Nigerian banks for which we extract bank financial statement data from 
Bankscope database which provides detailed information for Nigerian banks from 2006; 
hence, our dataset covers the 2006 to 2015 period. Data for 43 banks were obtained which 
consists of only 33 active banks. We exclude banks with missing values for 4 consecutive 
periods, and the sample is reduced to a final sample of 27 banks. Of the 27 banks, 13 banks 
are listed while 14 banks are either non-listed or delisted. Bankscope provides information on 
whether a bank is listed, non-listed or delisted. Finally, we did not make a distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial banks in order to obtain a large bank sample. Table 2 
reports the descriptive statistics including the mean and median for our data set. 
 
4.2. Measuring Ownership Concentration. 
 
To measure different levels of bank ownership concentration, we use a simple criterion 
reflecting whether or not a bank has a majority shareholder with at least 70% direct equity 
holding or less than 40% direct equity holdings. To capture high ownership concentration, we 
introduce a dummy variable ‘CN’ that take the value of one if a majority shareholder has at 
least 70% direct equity holding, representing banks with concentrated ownership. To capture 
dispersed ownership, we introduce a dummy variable ‘DISP’ that take the value of one if a 
majority shareholder has less than 40% direct equity holding, representing banks with a 
dispersed ownership structure or banks that are widely held. To capture moderate ownership 
concentration, we introduce a dummy variable ‘MOD’ that take the value of one if a majority 
shareholder has between 50% to 69% direct equity holding, representing banks with 
moderate ownership concentration. Of the 27 banks in our sample, 7 banks have a majority 
shareholder with 70% direct equity holding (representing banks with high ownership 
concentration), 14 banks have a majority shareholder with less than 40% direct equity 
holding (representing banks with dispersed ownership) while 6 banks have a majority 
shareholder with 50-69% direct equity holding (representing banks with a moderate 
ownership). 
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5. Methodology 
 
First, we follow prior literature to estimate bank profitability determinants using a static and 
dynamic panel model (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; 
Ozili, 2015; Ozili, 2017). We employ four measures of bank profitability (П) as a function of 
capital adequacy (EQTA), cost efficiency (CI), regulatory capital ratio (TRC), asset quality 
(AQ) and macroeconomic growth rate (ΔGDP).  
 
The model is given as: 
 П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                      (𝑂𝐿𝑆)     𝐸𝑞𝑛 (1) 
 П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  П 𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                                (𝐺𝑀𝑀)        𝐸𝑞𝑛 (2) 
 
Where П is the dependent variable representing four measures of profitability: return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), net interest margin (NIM) and recurring earnings 
power (REP). ROA is a measure of firm’s operational performance (Ozili, 2017), measured 
as the ratio of profit after tax to average asset for bank ‘i’ at year ‘t’. Return on equity (ROE) 
measures the return to equity shareholders measured as the ratio of profit after tax to average 
equity for bank ‘i’ at year ‘t’(Ozili, 2015). Net interest margin (NIM) measures the return to 
banks from interest-generating activities while recurring earnings power (REP) measures the 
ability of a firm/bank to generate income or profits over time assuming all current operational 
conditions remain constant; and is measured as pre-provision profit excluding net income 
from financial instruments and sale of securities and tax to average asset ratio. Cost 
efficiency (CI) is measured as cost to income ratio for bank i at year t, reflecting banks’ 
efficiency. Asset quality (AQ)1 is measured as loan loss reserves to gross loans for bank i in 
year t (Ozili, 2017). Capital adequacy (EQTA) is measured as total equity to average assets 
for bank i in year t while regulatory capital ratio (TRC) is measured as tier 1+2 capital 
divided by total risk weighted assets (Ozili, 2015). Gross domestic product growth rate 
(ΔGDP) is measured as the change in gross domestic product at year t. Next, we interact each 
profitability determinants on the ownership variables to detect the impact, if any, of different 
levels of ownership concentration on bank profitability; thus, we estimate the model: 
 П𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝑄𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                                        𝐸𝑞𝑛(3) 
 
                                                          
1 Other studies use loan loss provisions to gross loan to measure asset quality (Ozili and Outa, 2017, etc.) 
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П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  П 𝑡 − 1 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝐶𝐼𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                        𝐸𝑞𝑛(4) 
 П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                                           𝐸𝑞𝑛(5) 
 П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  П 𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑀𝑂𝐷∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                         𝐸𝑞𝑛(6) 
  П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                                                                                 𝐸𝑞𝑛(7) 
 П 𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  П 𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐼 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝑁 ∗ 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐶𝑁∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀                                               𝐸𝑞𝑛(8) 
 
To estimate the model, we use static and dynamic estimation techniques. The static 
estimation is the fixed effect OLS estimator to capture bank-specific differences while the 
dynamic estimation is the GMM estimator to capture dynamic adjustments to bank 
profitability. We consider dynamic adjustments to bank profitability by taking the lag of the 
profitability variables to take into account any possible endogeneity regarding profitability 
because one could argue that a profitable bank in the current year is likely to remain 
profitability in the next year due to profit persistence, thereby requiring analyses using lagged 
profitability values because today’s profitability can potentially explain tomorrow’s 
profitability. For the dynamic model, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference 
GMM estimator to estimate the dynamic model. The GMM instruments are only applied to 
the lagged dependent variable while the other variables are considered as strictly exogenous. 
We report the Hansen test (or the J-statistic). The Hansen test checks for the validity, i.e. the 
exogeneity of the entire set of instruments as a group. Bank fixed effect is included in the 
OLS and GMM estimations. We discuss the results in section 5. 
 
6. Discussion of Results 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Table 1A reports the full sample descriptive statistics for the variables while Table 1B reports 
the descriptive statistics for the profitability variables for each level of ownership 
concentration. In Table 1B, banks with high ownership concentration experience relatively 
higher return on assets (ROA), net interest margin (NIM) and recurring earnings power 
(REP), implying that banks with high concentrated ownership have better operational 
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performance while banks with dispersed ownership have the lowest return on assets (ROA) 
but have the highest return on equity (ROE) implying higher returns to shareholders in banks 
that are widely held (dispersed ownership). 
 
 
Table 1A: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 ROA ROE NIM REP CI AQ EQTA TRC ΔGDP 
 Mean  1.909  7.024  9.352  3.267  70.498  4.641  17.979  23.392  5.9600 
 Median  1.800  12.75  7.470  3.090  64.460  3.590  13.750  19.800  6.300 
 Maximum  13.790  45.920  68.180  24.890  306.800  33.090  98.800  124.020  8.200 
 Minimum -8.050 -209.03 -1.120 -3.720  23.260  0.000 -12.080 -13.810  2.700 
 Std. Dev.  2.698  31.716  10.424  3.418  30.695  4.263  15.883  18.031  1.585 
 Observations  137  137  135  137  135  134  141  112  270 
 
 
Table 1B: Ownership Concentration and Profitability 
Banks with high ownership concentration 
Profitability (П) Mean Median S.D Observations 
ROA 2.332 2.00 3.726 34 
ROE 6.826 18.325 38.538 34 
NIM 10.346 6.715 14.873 34 
REP 4.073 3.150 5.755 34 
Banks with Moderate Ownership  
Profitability (П) Mean Median S.D Observations 
ROA 1.932 1.715 3.419 26 
ROE 2.422 8.035 43.856 26 
NIM 7.478 7.610 3.433 26 
REP 2.944 3.095 2.960 26 
Banks with Dispersed Ownership 
Profitability (П) Mean Median S.D Observations 
ROA 1.714 1.770 1.741 77 
ROE 8.665 12.710 22.639 77 
NIM 9.524 7.700 9.561 77 
REP 3.021 3.060 1.807 77 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation among the variables. Focussing on the correlation between the 
profitability measures (ROA, ROE, NIM and REP) and ownership concentration variables 
(DISP, MOD and CN), we observe that DISP is positively correlated with profitability: ROA, 
ROE, NIM and REP implying that dispersed bank ownership has positive effect for bank 
profitability. MOD is negatively correlated with profitability: ROA, ROE, NIM and REP 
implying that moderate bank ownership has a negative impact on bank profitability. 
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Similarly, CN is also negatively correlated with profitability: ROA, ROE, NIM and REP, 
implying that concentrated ownership has negative effect for bank profitability. Overall, the 
correlation coefficients are not too high to be concerned with multicollinearity in the study. 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
              
              Variables ROA ROE NIM REP CI AQ EQTA TRC ΔGDP DISP CN MOD LISTED 
ROA 1.000             
              
              
ROE 0.839*** 1.000            
 0.000             
              
NIM 0.007 0.027 1.000           
 0.942 0.784            
              
REP 0.810*** 0.686*** -0.056 1.000          
 0.000 0.000 0.573           
              
CI -0.839*** -0.767*** 0.143 -0.925*** 1.000         
 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.000          
              
AQ -0.611*** -0.583*** 0.054 -0.369*** 0.482*** 1.000        
 0.000 0.000 0.588 0.000 0.000         
              
EQTA 0.260*** 0.088 0.162 0.253*** -0.285*** -0.014 1.000       
 0.008 0.378 0.102 0.009 0.004 0.885        
              
TRC 0.318*** 0.191* 0.069 0.268*** -0.325*** -0.171* 0.924*** 1.000      
 0.001 0.053 0.485 0.006 0.001 0.084 0.000       
              
ΔGDP -0.177* -0.128 -0.080 -0.151 0.116 0.114 -0.052 -0.053 1.000     
 0.075 0.196 0.421 0.129 0.242 0.252 0.604 0.591      
              
DISP 0.135 0.094 0.154 0.133 -0.142 -0.094 0.163* 0.140 0.207** 1.000    
 0.173 0.347 0.120 0.182 0.152 0.347 0.100 0.158 0.035     
              
CN -0.089 -0.045 -0.102 -0.123 0.126 -0.007 -0.173* -0.148 0.127 -0.635*** 1.000   
 0.367 0.653 0.300 0.217 0.203 0.945 0.081 0.133 0.201 0.000    
              
MOD -0.079 -0.072 -0.089 -0.042 0.0502 0.125 -0.029 -0.024 0.132 -0.614*** -0.219** 1.000  
 0.426 0.467 0.362 0.672 0.614 0.207 0.770 0.803 0.183 0.000 0.026   
              
LISTED 0.100 0.004 0.172* 0.0114 0.035 0.056 0.148 0.145 0.230** 0.308*** 0.414*** 0.034 1.000 
 0.314 0.967 0.082 0.909 0.721 0.571 0.135 0.145 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.734  
              
              
 
6.2. Regression Results 
6.2.1. Profitability Determinants 
Table 3 reports the result for bank profitability determinants. As can be observed, CI 
coefficient is negative and significantly associated with profitability (measured as ROA, ROE 
and REP) in the static (OLS) and dynamic (GMM) estimations, implying that cost efficiency 
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is a significant profitability determinant for Nigerian banks. EQTA coefficient is positive and 
significantly associated with profitability (measured as REP) in the static (OLS) and dynamic 
(GMM) estimations, implying that capital adequacy has positive effects for bank profitability 
in Nigeria. AQ, TRC and ΔGDP coefficients report conflicting signs in the static (OLS) and 
dynamic (GMM) estimations. 
 
Table 3: Bank Profitability Determinants 
 ROA ROE NIM REP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
C 10.088*** 
(8.75) 
 140.97*** 
(6.50) 
 9.359*** 
(2.89) 
 6.441*** 
(8.01) 
 
ROAt-1  0.177 
(0.98) 
      
ROEt-1    0.036 
(0.24) 
    
NIMt-1      -0.011 
(-0.02) 
  
REPt-1        0.106 
(1.49) 
CI -0.084*** 
(-12.63) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.47) 
-1.469*** 
(-11.69) 
-1.541*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.043** 
(-2.32) 
-0.062 
(-1.45) 
-0.079*** 
(-17.05) 
-0.081*** 
(-4.63) 
AQ -0.212*** 
(-4.81) 
-0.028 
(-0.09) 
-3.457*** 
(-4.18) 
-1.578 
(-0.52) 
0.205* 
(1.66) 
0.343 
(0.77) 
0.053* 
(1.72) 
-0.062 
(-0.55) 
TRC -0.004 
(-0.19) 
0.141 
(1.28) 
0.379 
(0.96) 
0.659 
(0.58) 
-0.007 
(-0.12) 
-0.205 
(-1.02) 
-0.016 
(-1.09) 
0.0007 
(0.02) 
EQTA -0.083* 
(-1.85) 
-0.032 
(-0.38) 
-0.874 
(-1.03) 
-1.627* 
(-1.88) 
0.124 
(0.98) 
0.151 
(1.42) 
0.094*** 
(2.98) 
0.113*** 
(3.25) 
ΔGDP -0.056 
(-0.57) 
-0.089 
(-0.36) 
-1.617 
(-0.88) 
-4.136* 
(-1.89) 
-0.009 
(-0.04) 
-0.301 
(-1.03) 
0.079 
(1.16) 
0.229* 
(1.91) 
         
Adjusted R² 82.88  0.759  91.53  91.13  
F-statistic 19.28  12.94  41.82  39.81  
J-Statistic  3.28  0.79 103 6.962  1.99 
P(J-Statistic)  0.35  0.85  0.07  0.57 
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64 
OLS and GMM regression includes bank fixed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI = cost to income ratio, representing cost efficiency. AQ 
= loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC = total regulatory capital ratio, representing bank 
regulatory capital. EQTA = equity to total asset ratio, representing capital adequacy ratio. ΔGDP = gross domestic product, 
growth rate, representing economic fluctuations. Пt-1 representing lagged profitability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, 
REPt-1 
 
6.2.2. Interaction Regression: Ownership Structure and Bank Profitability 
Table 4 reports the result for banks with dispersed ownership. DISP*CI coefficient is 
negative and significantly associated with profitability (ROA, ROE and REP) in the static 
(OLS) and dynamic (GMM) estimations, implying that cost efficiency is a significant 
profitability determinant for banks with dispersed ownership. Also, DISP*AQ coefficient is 
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negatively significant in the static estimation and insignificant in the dynamic estimation. 
DISP*TRC, DISP*EQTA and ΔGDP coefficients report insignificant signs. Overall, the 
result implies that cost efficiency is a significant determinant of the return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and recurring earnings power (REP) of banks with dispersed 
ownership and implies more efficient banks have better ROA, ROE and REP. 
 
Table 4: Bank Profitability and Dispersed Ownership 
 ROA ROE NIM REP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
c 7.629*** 
(4.14) 
 49.326 
(1.32) 
 7.089** 
(2.05) 
 5.586*** 
(3.87) 
 
ROAt-1  0.279 
(1.61) 
      
ROEt-1    0.168 
(1.37) 
    
NIMt-1      -0.055 
(-0.14) 
  
REPt-1        -0.020 
(-0.17) 
DISP*CI -0.098*** 
(-5.43) 
-0.163** 
(-2.15) 
-0.821** 
(-2.25) 
-1.417* 
(-1.81) 
-0.018 
(-0.55) 
-0.133 
(-1.51) 
-0.097*** 
(-6.86) 
-0.137*** 
(-4.37) 
DISP*AQ -0.169** 
(-2.12) 
-0.070 
(-0.21) 
-3.102* 
(-1.92) 
-1.092 
(-0.38) 
0.172 
(1.15) 
-0.142 
(-0.41) 
0.092 
(1.46) 
-0.045 
(0.28) 
DISP*TRC 0.005 
(0.13) 
0.109 
(0.79) 
0.634 
(0.88) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(-0.16) 
-0.171 
(-1.25) 
-0.008 
(-0.27) 
-0.049 
(0.72) 
DISP*EQTA -0.063 
(-0.82) 
-0.070 
(-0.54) 
0.318 
(0.21) 
-1.517 
(-1.19) 
0.171 
(1.19) 
0.025 
(0.22) 
0.073 
(1.22) 
0.049 
(0.72) 
ΔGDP -0.126 
(-0.81) 
-0.293 
(-0.68) 
-1.858 
(-0.59) 
-5.033 
(-1.14) 
0.065 
(0.22) 
-0.495 
(-1.19) 
0.064 
(0.53) 
-0.045 
(-0.15) 
         
Adjusted R² 58.32  0.32  90.79  72.77  
F-statistic 6.29  2.79  38.27  11.09  
J-statistic  3.57  1.59  4.86  1.29 
P(J-statistic)  0.31  0.66  0.18  0.73 
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64 
OLS and GMM regression includes bank fixed effect with no period fixed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI = cost to 
income ratio, representing cost efficiency. AQ = loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC = 
total regulatory capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA = equity to total asset ratio, representing 
capital adequacy ratio. ΔGDP = gross domestic product growth rate, representing economic fluctuations. DISP = 
dummy variable that equal one if the bank has a majority shareholder that holds less than 40 % direct equity holding, 
representing banks with dispersed ownership structure. Пt-1 representing lagged profitability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, 
NIMt-1, REPt-1 
 
Table 5 reports the result for banks with moderate ownership concentration. MOD*CI 
coefficient is negative and significantly associated with profitability (ROE) both in the static 
(OLS) and dynamic (GMM) estimations implying that cost efficiency significantly influence 
the level of ROE for Nigerian banks with moderate ownership concentration; while 
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MOD*TRC, MOD*EQTA and ΔGDP coefficients report insignificant signs or conflicting 
signs in the static and dynamic estimations. 
 
Table 5: Bank Profitability and Moderate Ownership Concentration 
 ROA ROE NIM REP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
c 3.286** 
(2.44) 
 49.942** 
(2.23) 
 8.712*** 
(3.80) 
 2.486** 
(2.06) 
 
ROAt-1  0.507 
(1.09) 
      
ROEt-1    0.374 
(1.05) 
    
NIMt-1      -0.156 
(-0.33) 
  
REPt-1        0.042 
(0.07) 
MOD*CI -0.081*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.155 
(-1.60) 
-1.935*** 
(-6.25) 
-2.535** 
(-1.99) 
-0.073** 
(-2.29) 
-0.093 
(-0.78) 
-0.065*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.017 
(-0.09) 
MOD*AQ -0.198 
(-0.96) 
1.879 
(0.74) 
-2.619 
(-0.77) 
31.956 
(0.63) 
0.203 
(0.58) 
-3.554 
(-0.95) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
-0.350 
(-0.05) 
MOD*TRC 0.112 
(0.43) 
0.534 
(0.47) 
2.022 
(0.47) 
4.866 
(0.39) 
-0.029 
(-0.06) 
0.027 
(0.03) 
0.022 
(0.09) 
1.411 
(0.71) 
MOD*EQTA -0.585 
(-1.35) 
3.785* 
(1.68) 
-10.636 
(-1.48) 
13.77 
(0.21) 
0.387 
(0.52) 
4.164 
(0.85) 
0.064 
(0.17) 
2.228 
(0.31) 
ΔGDP 0.067 
(0.41) 
-0.126 
(-0.42) 
0.429 
(0.16) 
0.015 
(0.01) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.009 
(-0.06) 
0.118 
(0.79) 
0.199* 
(1.78) 
         
Adjusted R² 51.26  46.73  91.11  58.20  
F-statistic 4.97  4.31  39.69  6.26  
J-Statistic  1.10  1.16  2.41  4.28 
P(J-Statistic)  0.78  0.76  0.49  0.23 
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64 
OLS and GMM regression includes bank fixed effect with no period fixed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI = cost to income ratio, 
representing cost efficiency. AQ = loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC = total regulatory 
capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA = equity to total asset ratio, representing capital adequacy ratio. 
ΔGDP = gross domestic product growth rate, representing economic fluctuations. MOD = dummy variable that equal one if the 
bank has a majority shareholder that holds between 50% to 69% direct equity holding, representing banks with a moderate 
ownership structure. Пt-1 representing lagged profitability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, REPt-1 
 
Table 6 reports the result for banks with high ownership concentration. CN*CI coefficient is 
negative and significantly associated with profitability (ROA) in the static model and is 
insignificant in the dynamic model, providing conflicting results. Also, CN*AQ coefficient is 
negatively significant in the static model and insignificant in the dynamic model while 
CN*TRC, CN*EQTA and ΔGDP coefficients also report insignificant signs. Drawing 
inference from the two estimations, the results show that the profitability determinants report 
conflicting signs. 
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Table 6: Bank Profitability and High Ownership Concentration 
 ROA ROE NIM REP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
c 3.661*** 
(2.81) 
 54.224** 
(2.28) 
 9.728*** 
(4.33) 
 3.695*** 
(3.25) 
 
ROAt-1  -0.509 
(-0.91) 
      
ROEt-1    -1.157 
(-1.05) 
    
NIMt-1      -0.606 
(-0.53) 
  
REPt-1        -0.725* 
(-1.73) 
CN*CI -0.077*** 
(-3.32) 
0.019 
(0.07) 
-1.767*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.449 
(-0.10) 
-0.035 
(-0.87) 
0.221 
(0.71) 
-0.076*** 
(-3.77) 
0.257 
(0.91) 
CN*AQ -0.526** 
(-2.11) 
-2.710 
(-1.32) 
-3.278 
(-0.72) 
-0.449 
(-0.10) 
0.469 
(1.09) 
-0.885 
(-0.68) 
-0.166 
(-0.76) 
-3.074 
(-1.29) 
CN*TRC 0.059 
(0.34) 
3.723 
(0.99) 
-1.636 
(-0.52) 
6.293 
(0.77) 
-0.027 
(-0.09) 
1.252 
(0.45) 
-0.016 
(-0.11) 
1.756 
(1.19) 
CN*EQTA -0.429 
(-1.24) 
-6.958 
(-1.31) 
-0.513 
(-0.08) 
-1.267 
(-1.06) 
-0.027 
(-0.09) 
-2.095 
(-0.65) 
0.009 
(0.03) 
-3.861 
(-1.35) 
ΔGDP -0.002 
(-0.01) 
0.364 
(1.15) 
-2.208 
(-0.71) 
5.145 
(1.31) 
-0.095 
(-0.32) 
0.141 
(0.37) 
0.041 
(0.28) 
0.309** 
(2.61) 
         
Adjusted R² 48.65  32.45  90.41  58.47  
F-statistic 4.58  2.81  36.63  6.32  
J-statistic  0.62  0.32  4.17  2.95 
P(J-statistic)  0.90  0.96  0.24  0.40 
Observation 103 64 103 64 103 63 103 64 
OLS and GMM regression includes bank fixed effect with no period fixed effect. Standard errors are not clustered. T-statistics 
are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. CI = cost to income ratio, 
representing cost efficiency. AQ = loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio, representing asset quality. TRC = total regulatory 
capital ratio, representing bank regulatory capital. EQTA = equity to total asset ratio, representing capital adequacy ratio. 
ΔGDP = gross domestic product growth rate, representing economic fluctuations. CN = dummy variable that equal one if the 
bank has a majority shareholder that holds at least 70% direct equity holding, representing banks with concentrated ownership 
structure. Пt-1 representing lagged profitability values in ROAt-1, ROEt-1, NIMt-1, REPt-1 
 
6.2.3. Sensitivity Analysis: OLS vs GMM 
To address some concern in favour of using one estimation technique i.e. OLS or GMM 
instead of both techniques, we use two estimation techniques to show that some of the main 
findings are not sensitive to alternative estimations particularly when profit persistence is 
taken into account. Assuming we use only OLS findings in Table 4, for instance, we observe 
that cost efficiency and asset quality are significant determinants of ROA and ROE for banks 
with dispersed ownership but these results do not hold true for asset quality when we adjust 
for profit persistence in the dynamic model. Similarly, focusing on the OLS results in Table 
5, we observe that cost efficiency is a significant determinant of ROA, ROE, NIM and REP 
for banks with moderate ownership but the result only holds true for ROE when we adjust for 
profit persistence using the dynamic model. Similarly, focusing on the OLS results in Table 
6, we observe that cost efficiency and asset quality are significant determinants of ROA for 
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banks with high ownership concentration but the results report conflicting evidence when we 
adjust for profit persistence using the dynamic model. Therefore, we base our final inference 
on the findings that do not change when both the static and dynamic estimations are used.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the impact of different levels of ownership concentration on bank 
profitability in Nigeria. The findings indicate that banks with high concentrated ownership 
have higher return on assets, net interest margin and recurring earnings power, implying that 
banks with high ownership concentration have better operational performance while banks 
with dispersed ownership have the lowest return on assets and have the highest return on 
equity, implying that banks with dispersed ownership provide better returns to shareholders. 
We also find that higher efficiency has positive effects for ROA among banks with dispersed 
ownership, and has positive effects for ROE for banks with moderate ownership 
concentration. The implication of the findings is that, although banks with concentrated 
ownership record higher profitability, their profitability do not appear to be significantly 
driven by economic drivers of bank profitability. 
For policy purposes, if bank regulators/supervisors are concerned about improving bank 
profitability, we recommend that bank regulators should encourage concentrated bank 
ownership provided that control benefits are shared between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders. Policy makers should encourage high concentrated ownership which can help 
improve firm performance. Moving forward, future research could investigate the impact of 
foreign ownership and institutional ownership on bank profitability in developing countries. 
Also, in other developing countries where the government has full or part ownership of 
banks, future research could examine whether full or part state ownership of banks improves 
banks’ operational performance in developing counties.  
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